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PENUMBRAS, PERIPHERIES, EMANATIONS, 
THINGS FUNDAMENTAL AND THINGS 
FORGOTIEN: THE GRISWOLD CASE 
Paul G. Kauper* 
Griswold v. Connecticut1 held by a seven-to-two margin that the Connecticut criminal statute forbidding the use of contracep-
tive devices by married couples was unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment. This simplified version of the holding, however, 
does not adequately portray the great variety of doctrines relied upon 
by the Justices constituting the majority. The opinion of the Court, 
·written by Mr. Justice Douglas, found the statute invalid because 
it invaded a constitutionally protected right of marital privacy found 
to emanate from the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights and 
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The 
separate opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, expressed concurrence in 
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion and then proceeded to an independent 
ground-that the right of privacy as invoked and protected in this 
case is a fundamental right protected by the due process clause 
against state deprivation. The opinion used the ninth amendment 
to help bolster the independent fundamental rights theory. The 
separate concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, incorporating 
views expressed earlier in a dissenting opinion,2 clearly disassociated 
itself from the opinion of the Court and rested squarely on the 
proposition that the Connecticut statute intruded into the privacy 
of married couples, thereby impairing a fundamental right protected 
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice 
White, writing a separate concurring opinion, likewise explicitly 
rested his case on the due process clause, finding that the Connecti-
cut statute as applied to married couples deprived them of liberty 
without due process of law, since it invaded the right to be free from 
regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship. The dis-
senting opinions by Justices Black and Stewart rejected the notion 
that the "right of privacy" on which the case turned finds support in 
the specifics of the Bill of Rights, and further rejected the idea that 
the Court 1s free, in the interpretation of the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, to formulate a conception of funda-
mental rights having no foundation in the specific guarantees of the 
Constitution. 
• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 597 (1961). 
[235] 
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This brief introductory statement is sufficient to point up the 
fascinating feature of Griswold: it laid bare the basic differences 
within the Court respecting its role in the protection of fundamental 
rights and respecting the interrelationship of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the Bill of Rights as a central aspect of this problem. It 
is to these aspects of the case that my comments are directed.8 
The varying theories followed in the several opinions in the 
Griswold case can be fully understood and appreciated only in the 
context of the tortuous but fascinating history of the judicial inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment. 
I. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
By the end of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court had 
committed itself to an interpretation of the due process clause 
whereby the clause was enlarged beyond its original connotation of 
procedural regularity and converted into a vehicle for protecting 
the so-called fundamental rights.4 In the nventieth century the 
Court has used various expressions to describe its understanding of 
fundamental rights: they are the rights implicit in those "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
our civil and political institutions" ;5 they are those rights "so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.''6 In his classic opinion for the Court in Palko v. Gon-
necticut,7 Mr. Justice Cardozo spoke of the rights "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty."8 The rights protected as fundamental 
include both procedural and substantive rights. As applied in its 
earlier stages, the due process clause as the guarantee of procedural 
rights centered on the "fair trial" concept.9 The substantive rights 
emphasized in the earlier stages of the development of the clause 
were liberty of contract and freedom in the enjoyment and use of 
property. These eventually suffered a decline in the degree of 
3. The editors requested me to give my interpretation and comments respecting 
the Griswold decision. No attempt is made here to deal at length with the issues and 
questions to which the comments are directed or to call the reader's attention to the 
voluminous literature on these matters. The documentation is on the whole limited to 
the necessary case citations. 
4. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
5. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). 
6. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
7. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
8. Id. at 325. For a collection of phrases used by the Court in formulating the funda-
mental rights theory, see Mr. Justice :Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 511-12 n.4. 
9. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937): Hurtado v. California, II0 
U.S. 516 (1884). 
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judicial protection received, but in their place the Court later stressed 
the freedoms specifically set forth in the first amendment-the free-
doms of religion, speech, press and assembly.10 
A notable and controversial aspect of this development was the 
Court's recognition that the fundamental rights protected under the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had no necessary 
relationship to the specifics set forth in the first eight amendments 
as restrictions on the federal government. In other words, the Court 
rejected the idea that the effect of the fourteenth amendment was to 
make the first eight amendments apply to the states. In his opinion 
in Palko, Mr. Justice Cardozo said that the due process clause ab-
sorbed the specifics of the Bill of Rights only insofar as they were 
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."11 Indeed, the 
whole process whereby the freedoms of the first amendment were 
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment as fundamental rights 
was a clear-cut application of substantive due process concepts. The 
end result has been that the Court has, on the one hand, rejected 
certain specifics catalogued in the first eight amendments as non-
fundamental and has, on the other hand, recognized as fundamental 
certain liberties not specified in these amendments. 
To state these developments in what may be called the "main 
line" in the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is not to 
suggest that they have gone unchallenged. The elder Mr. Justice 
Harlan dissented from the proposition that the rights protected under 
the first eight amendments were not included in the rights protected 
under the due process clause.12 Mr. Justice Holmes spearheaded a 
group of dissenters who remonstrated against the use of the due 
process clause to invalidate state legislation found to be an inter-
ference with liberty of contract.13 Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. 
Justice Douglas, forcibly stated in his dissenting opinion in Adamson 
v. California14 his objections to the fundamental rights interpreta-
tion, which he equated with natural law thinking. In his view the 
effect of the fourteenth amendment was to make the Bill of Rights 
apply to the states, but the Court could not use the due process clause 
as a vehicle for protecting any other rights on the theory that they 
were fundamental. Justices Murphy and Rutledge, in their dissents 
in Adamson, had agreed that the specifics of the Bill of Rights ap-
10. For references to the cases and a review of this development, see KAuPER, 
FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 18-54 (1956). 1 
11. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
12. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (dissenting opinion); Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (dissenting opinion). 
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (dissenting opinion). 
14. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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plied to the states but did not agree that those specifics were the only 
rights protected under the fourteenth amendment. 
The course of the decisions in recent years has tended to obscure 
the application of the fundamental rights theory. The judicial pro• 
tection of economic and proprietary liberties-the liberties em• 
phasized in the early substantive rights interpretation of the due 
process clause-has declined. The Court has said that these liberties 
are subject to restriction in the reasonable exercise of the states' 
power to regulate economic matters, and has made it clear that in 
this area judicial review of the reasonableness of legislation operates 
at a minimal level.15 Indeed, Justices Black and Douglas, in ·writing 
for the Court in some of the cases, have stated that the Court is not 
free to inquire at all into the reasonableness of restrictions on eco-
nomic liberty, since that is an intrusion into the legislative domain 
in areas where the Constitution imposes no specific restriction.10 On 
the other hand, the Court has come to recognize that all of the first 
.amendment freedoms are fundamental and therefore protected 
against the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.17 Likewise, the Court has found in more recent de-
cisions that some of the procedural safeguards embodied in the 
specifics of the Bill of Rights are fundamental and must therefore 
be respected by the states. The right to counsel,18 the freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure,19 the privilege against self-incrimina-
15. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
16. See Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. 
Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), and Mr. Justice .Black's opinions 
for the Court in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 
U.S. 525 (1949), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Mr. Justice Harlan con• 
curred in a separate opinion in Skrupa, on the ground that the statute there involved 
bore "a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective." Id. at 733. 
In his opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 
supra, Mr. Justice Black said that, beginning with the Nebbia case, the Court had 
steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of 
cases, and in so doing had consciously returned closer and closer "to the earlier con• 
stitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what are found to be 
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their 
laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some 
valid federal law." 335 U.S. at 536. 
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); De Jonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931) (freedom of press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speeclt). 
The freedom from expropriation of property without compensation, guaranteed 
by the fifth amendment, is also recognized as a fundamental right protected under 
the fourteenth amendment. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Chi• 
cago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Likewise the prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment, found in the eighth amendment, has been made effective 
against the states under the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962). 
18. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U~. 335 (1963). 
19. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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tion,20 and the right of con£rontation21 have been extended to the 
states by virtue of the due process clause. Moreover, the Court has 
now made it clear that when a right specifically embodied in the 
Bill of Rights is recognized as fundamental, it has the same full scope 
and meaning as a restriction on state action as it does in its primary 
context within the Bill of Rights as a restriction on the federal gov-
ernment.22 It is in this sense that the first amendment and the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights specifying the procedural guarantees 
mentioned above are said to be incorporated into the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis in recent years on the protection 
under the fourteenth amendment of certain specifics of the Bill of 
Rights, the Court has continued to afford protection in the name of 
due process against governmental restrictions found to constitute 
unwarranted or unreasonable interference with rights or liberties 
not included in the specifics of the first eight amendments. Thus, 
it has invalidated under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment a state statute subjecting. public employees to arbitrary 
dismissal23 and a state regulation arbitrarily restricting admission 
to the bar.24 The Court relied on the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment to invalidate racial segregation in the schools of the 
District of Columbia.25 Similarly, in holding invalid the federal 
restriction on the issuance of passports to Communists, the Court 
found that the statute was an unduly broad restriction on the right 
to .travel, which was declared to be a fundamental liberty protected 
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.26 In addition, 
the Court has never overruled cases of earlier vintage such as Meyer 
20. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
21. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
22. See Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964), and Mr. Justice Goldberg's separate opinion in Pointer v. Texas, supra note 21. 
Mr. Justice Harlan has dissented from this view, taking the position that state criminal 
procedures are invalid under the due process clause only if they are fundamentally 
unfair. See his dissenting opinion in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, and the concurring 
opinions by Justices Harlan and Stewart in the Pointer case, supra. Mr. Justice Harlan 
likewise makes a distinction between the fundamental freedoms of expression protected 
against state action under the due process clause and the freedoms stated in the first 
amendment as a restriction on Congress. See his separate opinion in Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). To the same effect, see Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting 
opinion in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
23. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
24. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
25. "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper govern-
mental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a 
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the 
Due Process Clause." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954). 
26. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 
U.S. 116 (1958). 
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v. Nebraska,27 invalidating a Nebraska statute forbidding the use of 
foreign languages in teaching public school classes, and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters,28 invalidating an Oregon statute requiring parents 
to send their children to public schools. The Nebraska statute was 
found to be an arbitrary interference with "the calling of modem 
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowl-
edge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their 
own";29 the Oregon statute was found to be an arbitrary interfer-
ence with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of their children. These cases were clearly grounded on the 
fundamental rights interpretation of the due process clause, and 
there has been no suggestion in later cases that they have been 
repudiated.30 
The decisions in the main line of interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment support the following conclusions: (1) The Court 
has not accepted the thesis that the effect of the fourteenth amend-
ment is to make all of the first eight amendments applicable to the 
states. (2) The Court has adhered to the idea that the due process 
clause protects only those rights that are fundamental, and that 
specifics of the Bill of Rights are absorbed into the fourteenth 
amendment only because they are regarded as fundamental. (3) The 
Court has continued to recognize that the fundamental rights pro-
tected under the due process clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments may include rights not included in the specifics of the 
Bill of Rights. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE Griswold OPINIONS 
A. Introduction: The Poe v. Ullman Dissents 
The_ opinions in Griswold must be examined against the back-
ground of this historical development to see what contribution they 
have made in this troubled area of constitutional interpretation. 
27. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
28. 268 U.S. !HO (1925). 
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 394 (1923). 
30. For other earlier cases, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), uphold-
ing a compulsory vaccination law, and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upholding a 
statute authorizing compulsory sterilization of mental defectives in state institutions. 
Both cases rested on the assumption that the due process clause afforded protection 
against arbitrary or unreasonable invasion of bodily integrity. Sec also Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), holding invalid under the equal protection clause a 
statute requiring sterilization of certain classes of habitual' criminals. Mr. Justice 
Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion, said that the statute involved one of "the 
basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541, 
For other cases resting on the use _of the due process clause to protect against un-
reasonable restriction on personal liberties, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 
504 n. • (separate opinion of White, J.) 
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First, however, attention should be called 'to the dissenting opinions 
of Justices Douglas and Harlan in the earlier case of Poe v. Ullman,31 
in which the Court reµised to pass on the constitutionality of the 
Connecticut birth control law on the ground that such a decision 
would be premature, since there was no showing that the statute 
was actually being enforced. In their separate opinions these two 
Justices, after concluding that the elements of a justiciable case or 
controversy were present, found the Connecticut ban on the use of 
contraceptives unconstitutional because of its invasion of the right 
of privacy of married couples. 
In his Poe dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas said that although he 
believed that "due process" as used in the fourteenth amendment 
included all the prptections of the first eight amendments, he did not 
think it was confined to them.32 He cited several cases to support his 
view that the liberty protected by the due process clause includes 
liberties in addition to those stated in the first eight amendments.33 
Indeed, he suggested that the due process clause could be used as a 
basis for inquiry concerning the constitutionality of social legislation 
dealing with business and economic matters, and that while the 
legislative judgment on these matters is nearly conclusive, it is not 
beyond judicial inquiry.34 Apparently Mr. Justice Douglas was ready 
to use the "liberty" phrase of the due process clause as a source of 
judicially protected rights and interests, apart from the specifics of 
the Bill of Rights. He said that "liberty" was a conception that 
sometimes gained content from either the emanations of the specific 
guarantees "or from experience with the requirements of a free 
society."35 He characterized the right of privacy as emanating "from 
the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live."86 
This language obviously bears a close relationship to such language 
as "fundamental principles of liberty and justice," "ordered liberty," 
and the other phrases used in the · past to define the fundamental 
rights protected under the due process clause. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe, found the Connecticut 
statute invalid because it was an unwarranted invasion by the state 
of the privacy of the marital relationship, which he asserted was 
protected as a fundamental liberty secured by the fourteenth amend-
ment. His opinion is notable for its review and reasoned defense of 
31. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
32. Id. at 516. 
33. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (right to travel); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children). 
34. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,518 (1961) (dissenting opinion). 
35. Id. at 517. 
36. Id. at 521. 
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the fundamental rights theory. This dissenting opinion impresses me 
as not only the ablest and most persuasive opinion that has been 
written on this subject, but also, because of its careful analysis of the 
right of marital privacy, the best opinion that has been ·written on the 
constitutionality of the Connecticut statute. Mr. Justice Harlan 
made it clear that he did not rest his decision on the ground that the 
statute's general policy against the use of contraceptives was an ir-
rational exercise of the police power; his objection was to the method 
by which the state attempted to enforce this policy insofar as it 
reached into the privacy of the marital home. Because he regarded 
this as a particularly sensitive area, he felt that the Court was under 
a special duty to protect this relationship against arbitrary invasion. 
B. The Opinion of the Court: Mr. Justice Douglas 
We tum now to the Griswold opinions. Mr. Justice Douglas' 
unusually short opinion of the Court combined a curious, puzzling 
mixture of reasoning with extraordinary freedom in the interpreta-
tion of earlier cases. His whole opinion was directed to the end of 
demonstrating that the right of marital privacy is protected under 
the Bill of Rights and then carried over as a restriction on the states 
via the fourteenth amendment. At the outset he seemingly rejected 
the possibility of invalidating the Connecticut statute on the ground 
that its policy against the use of contraceptives constituted an un-
reasonable exercise of the police power and hence a deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law.37 Rather, it was the direct opera-
tion of the law on the intimate relation of husband and wife, and 
on their physician's role in one aspect of that relation, which raised 
the crucial issue. He stated that the Constitution has protected cer-
tain rights which are derived from the Bill of Rights, although not 
expressly named there. He spoke of rights "peripheral" to the specifics 
named in the first eight amendments and argued that without these 
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. Thus, he 
s_aid, the Court has interpreted the first amendment as including 
such peripheral rights as the right of association. 88 On the basis of 
this peripheral rights reasoning-and at this point the reader ex-
periences a sense of confusion-he interpreted the Meyer and Pierce 
cases to mean that the first amendment forbids a state to "contract 
the spectrum of available knowledge";89 he then concluded that part 
37. "Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York •.• should be 
our guide. But we decline that invitation •••• We do not sit as a super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions." 381 U.S. at 482. 
38. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 
U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
39. 381 U.S. at 481-82. 
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of the opinion by saying, "and so we reaffirm the principle of the 
Pierce and Meyer cases."40 
But then Mr. Justice Douglas went on to restate the peripheral 
rights theory. He interpreted the cases previously cited in support 
of the notion of peripheral rights to mean that the specific guaran-
tees have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees, 
that help give them life and substance. At that point he went to the 
heart of his argument, saying that "zones of privacy" are created oy 
various guarantees: the first amendment, which in its penumbra 
includes the privacy linked with the freedom of association; the 
third amendment, which prohibits the quartering of soldiers in any 
house in time of peace without the consent of the owner; the fourth 
amendment, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure; 
and the fifth amendment, which protects against self-incrimination. 
He also threw in for good measure the ninth amendment, although 
its relevancy to his argument in showing a zone of privacy is not 
apparent. He quoted the language of Boyd v. United States41 that 
the fourth and fifth amendments protect against all governmental 
invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"42 
and the statement in Mapp v. 0 hio43 that the fourth amendment 
creates "a right to privacy, no less important than any other right 
carefully and particularly reserved to the people."44 He said that 
the Court has had many controversies over the penumbra! rights of 
"privacy and repose," and construed those cases45 to bear witness 
that the right of privacy pressing for recognition in Griswold was 
a legitimate one. 
Griswold, he continued, "concerns a relationship lying within 
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of 
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, 
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destruc-
tive impact upon that relationship."46 Such a law could not stand, 
because " 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities 
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by 
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the 
area of protected freedoms.' "47 
40. Id. at 483. 
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
42. Id. at 630. 
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
44. Id. at 656. 
45. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); 
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
46. 381 U.S. at 485. -
47. Id. at 485 (quoting from NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1958)). 
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The opinion concluded with the following paragraph: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights 
-older than our political parties, older than our school sys-
tem. Marriage ... is an association that promotes a way of life, 
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association 
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.48 
Taken as a whole, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion is ambiguous 
and uncertain in its use of the specifics of the Bill of Rights to in• 
validate the Connecticut statute. Is the right of privacy included 
within the penumbra of the marriage association and is this associa-
tion in turn identifiable, as suggested by the last paragraph of the 
opinion, with a general right of association peripheral to the first 
amendment freedoms? Or is the intimacy of the marriage relation• 
ship included within a general zone of privacy of home and family 
derived both from the specifically protected zones of privacy and 
the penumbra of privacy emanating from specific rights? Or is it the 
theory of the case that the Connecticut statute violated the funda-
mental rights associated with family and the home, not because the 
statute rested on a policy which unreasonably interfered with these 
rights but because it employed means which violated a right of 
privacy derived from the specifics of the Bill of Rights? Whatever 
the interpretation, it is clear that Mr. Justice Douglas worked hard 
in his opinion to demonstrate that the decision does not rest in-
dependently on an interpretation of the due process clause, but is 
based on implications from those of the :first eight amendments 
which are made applicable to the states by means of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
C. Concurring Opinions 
I. Mr. Justice Goldberg 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and 
Mr. Justice Brennan, wrote a separate opinion. Although he said 
at the outset that he concurred both in the judgment and the opinion 
of the Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg devoted the major part of his 
opinion to the elaboration of a separate theory having no necessary 
relation to the notion that the right of privacy at issue is an emana-
tion from specifics of the Bill of Rights or embraced within the 
penumbra of these rights. While Mr. Justice Goldberg does not 
accept the view that due process as used in the fourteenth amend-
ment includes all of the first eight amendments, he does agree that 
48. Id. at 486. 
December 1965] Penumbras and Peripheries 245 
' 
the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are funda-
mental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. 
The major portion of his opinion was devoted to an elaboration of 
the fundamental rights theory. He repeated with apparent approval 
the Court's statement in Snyder v. Massachusetts49 that the due 
process clause protects rights that are "so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."50 To 
support the proposition that the liberty protected under the due 
process clause includes the right to marry, establish a home, and 
bring up children, he referred to the Meyer case and to oth~r cases 
in which the Court has used the due process clauses of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to protect fundamental personal liberties. 
This part of his opinion is basically a restatement of the classic 
fundamental rights theory. What is really novel, however, about 
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opini?n is that he further supports the 
Court's role in protecting fundamental rights other than those stated 
in the Constitution by falling back on the ninth amendment.51 For 
him the ninth amendment shows the intent of the Constitution's 
authors that fundamental personal rights should not be denied pro-
tection• simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight 
amendments. • 
Mr. Justice Goldberg went on to say that the right of privacy is 
a fundamental personal right emanating "from the totality· of the 
constitutional scheme under which we live,"52 and that the Con-
necticut statute dealt with a particularly important and sensitive 
area of privacy-that of the home and the marital relation. Connecti-
cut had not shown that the law served any "subordinating interest 
which is compelling"53 or that it was "necessary and not merely ra-
tionally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state 
policy."54 At most, the state argued that there was some rational 
relation between this statute and what was ·admittedly a legitimate 
subject of state concern-the discouragement of extramarital rela-
tions. While questioning the rationality of this justification, Mr. · 
Justice Goldberg said that "in any event it [was] clear that the state 
49. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
50. 381 U.S. at 487 (quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
See also id. at 493, where in stating the fundamental rights theory he draws upon the 
language in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in the Poe case, quoted in text 
accompanying note 35 supra. _ 
51. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
52, 381_ U.S. at 494 (quoting from Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (dissenting 
opinion of Douglas, J.)). 
53. Id. at 497 (quoting from Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). 
54. Ibid. (quoting from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)). 
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interest in safeguarding marital fidelity could be served by a more 
discriminately tailored statute, which [ did] not . . . sweep unneces-
sarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt with 
and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples."55 
2. Mr. Justice Harlan 
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion very clearly disassociated 
itself from the Douglas opinion, which Harlan reads as adopting the 
view that the fourteenth amendment protects only the rights guaran-
teed by the letter or the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Just as 
Mr. Justice Harlan rejects the notion that the effect of the fourteenth 
amendment is to make the specifics of the Bill of Rights apply to 
the states, so he also rejects the idea that the fourteenth amendment 
cannot be used to protect rights that are not stated in the Bill of 
Rights. He rests his concurrence on the views he stated at length in 
his dissenting opinion in the Poe case, where he found the Con-
necticut statute invalid as an intrusion upon the intimacies of the 
marital relation that come within the protection accorded to the 
home. 
3. Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice White in his separate concurring opinion also clearly 
disassociated himself from the notion implicit in the majority opin-
ion that only those rights embraced within the letter or the penum-
bra of the Bill of Rights are protected under the fourteenth amend-
ment. He fell back upon the general theory that the fourteenth 
amendment protects against arbitrary or capricious denial of liberty 
and that the liberty thus protected includes the right "to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children"56 and "the liberty ... to 
direct the upbringing and education of children,"57 and that these 
are among the "basic civil rights of man."58 He also spoke of the 
right "to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage rela-
tionship."59 Thus, any statute forbidding the use of birth control 
devices by married persons, prohibiting doctors from giving advice 
to married persons on proper and effective methods of birth control, 
and having the clear effect of denying to disadvantaged citizens of 
the state access to medical assistance and up-to-date information with 
respect to methods of birth control, bears a substantial burden of 
justification when attacked under the fourteenth amendment. Con-
55. Id. at 497-98. 
56. Id. at 502 (quoting from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262, 390, 399 (1923)). 
57. Ibid. (quoting from Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)). 
58. Ibid. (quoting from Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
59. Id. at 503. 
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ceding that the state's policy against all forms of promiscuous or 
illicit sexual relationships is a permissible legislative goal, Mr. Justice 
White then proceeded to demonstrate that this particular restriction 
on the use of contraceptive devices by married couples could not be 
justified by reference to that legitimate public policy. The distinc-
tive feature of Mr. Justice White's opinion, apart from the fact that 
it is a clear articulation of the substantive rights interpretation of 
due process, is the care with which he examines the Connecticut 
law in determining whether any rational consideration appropriate 
to matters of public concern justifies the restriction. 
D. Dissenting Opinions 
I. Mr. Justice Black 
For those acquainted with Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion 
in the Adamson case, his dissent in Griswold comes as no surprise, 
since in his Adamson dissent he had already taken the position that 
the fourteenth amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to 
the states and that there is no basis for a judicial formulation of 
fundamental rights other than those embraced by the specifics of 
the first eight amendments. His dissent in large part reaffirms the 
basic idea set forth in his Adamson opinion-that it is th~ business 
of the Court to protect the specific rights guaranteed in the Con-
stitution but not to pass judgment on the reasonableness of state 
legislative enactments alleged to impair other fundamental rights 
that have their source in a natural-law type of thinking. He there-
fore basically disagrees with the theory expressed by Justices Harlan 
and White in their concurring opinions. Likewise, he cannot accept 
the view stated by Mr. Justice Goldberg that the ninth amendment 
is a basis for judicial assertion of new fundamental rights, since, as 
he sees it, this is simply another way of stating the discredited natural 
rights philosophy. Moreover, he rejects the theory stated in Mr. 
Justice Douglas' opinion that the right of privacy involved in Gris-
wold is embraced within the penumbra of rights specified in the 
Bill of Rights; he feels that it is much too broad a generalization 
to say that the specifics of the Bill of Rights create a general right of 
privacy of the kind relied upon by the Court. 
2. Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on essentially the same grounds.60 
He agreed with Mr. Justice Black that the t).Se of the ninth amend-
60. Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Griswold is the first clear-cut state-
ment by him rejecting the formulation in the name of the due process- clause of a 
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ment added nothing to the case so far as the Court's power to protect 
rights not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights is concerned, 
since the purpose of both the ninth and tenth amendments was to 
make clear that the federal government was to be a government of 
express, limited powers and that all rights and powers not delegated 
to it were retained by the people. Indeed, in his view, to say that 
the ninth amendment, intended as a restriction on the federal gov-
ernment, has anything to do with this case, involving the validity 
of a state statute, "is to turn somersaults with history."61 
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF Griswold TO GENERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
In appraising the significance of Griswold we must distinguish 
between the immediate impact pf the case and its larger significance 
in terms of general constitutional theory. Griswold holds no more 
than that a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married 
couples is inyalid as an invasion of a right of marital privacy pro-
tected against the states under the fourteenth amendment. The 
case does not mean that a state may not prohibit the manufacture 
and sale of contraceptives; still less does it suggest any questioning 
of the validity of laws dealing with illicit sexual relations. Two 
important types of right are stressed: the rights associated with mar-
riage, family, and the home, and a right of privacy incident to con-
stitutionally protected activities and relations. Family and marital 
rights have assumed a new constitutional significance, and fresh 
vitality has been given to the Meyer and Pierce decisions. Further-
more, recognition of the right of privacy may well be an opening 
wedge for extension of that right in new directions. 
The larger significance of the case, however, is the contribution, 
if any, that it makes to general constitutional theory respecting 
fundamental rights, the relationship of these rights to the specifics 
of the Bill of Rights, and the standard to be employed by the Court 
in passing on the constitutionality of legislation allegedly impinging 
on fundamental rights. 
A. Application of the Bill of Rights Guarantees to the States 
Griswold does not bear directly on the question whether the 
effect of. the fourteenth amendment is to make all the specifics of 
theory of fundamental substantive rights not identifiable with the specifics of the first 
eight amendments. Compare his position, as expressed in his concurring opinion in 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), that the due process clause assures a fundamental 
right to procedural fairness, and his reference; in his opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 
528, to the use of the due process clause -for that purpose. 
61. 381 11.S. at 529. 
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the Bill of Rights apply to the states, but it seems clear that Justices 
Black and Douglas have gained no new converts to their position on 
this issue. Indeed, Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion 
joined _by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, ex-
pressly said that he has not accepted that view, although he does 
agree that the fourteenth amendment does make applicable to 
the states the specifics which are fundamental. Mr. Justice Harlan 
has always made it abundantly clear that he totally rejects the in-
corporation theory in all of its aspects. Justices Clark, Stewart, and 
White have never identified themselves with the Black-Douglas 
thesis, and nothing in the separate opinions by Justices White and 
Stewart in Griswold would suggest an acceptance of that thesis. At 
most, then, it may be said that a majority of the Justices are ready 
to find that specifics of the Bill of Rights apply to the states only 
when those specifics are identified as fundamental rights. It is worth 
emphasizing that a majority could not have been mustered in Gris-
wold to hold the statute invalid except for the concurrence of those 
Justices who found the statute invalid as an invasion of a right which 
they characterized as "fundamental." 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Rights Not 
Specified in the Bill of Rights 
The most immediate impact of the Griswold decision is on the 
concomitant question whether rights not specified in the Bill of 
Rights are protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The decision is ambiguous in this respect. According 
to one view expressed in the case and supported by five of the 
Justices,62 the right of privacy on which the case hangs is embraced 
within the penumbra or periphery of specifics guaranteed in the first 
eight amendments. On the other hand, it is also clear that the idea 
that the right of privacy is a fundamental right quite apart from the 
specifics of the Bill of Rights also receives the support of a majority 
of the Justices. Certainly Justices Harlan and White support this 
view, and I interpret Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion to the same 
effect, although the fundamental rights thinking in his opinion is 
bolstered by an appeal to the ninth amendment. Griswold can thus 
be interpreted as a reaffirmation by a majority of the Court of the 
62. This is the view expressed in the opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice 
Douglas. Mr. Justice Clark concurred in this sub silentio, since he did not write a 
separate opinion. Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, con-
curred in the Douglas opinion, although he also found an independent basis for the 
result in the. fundamental rights theory. 
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fundamental rights theory-both in the sense that only fundamental 
rights derived from the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the 
fourteenth amendment and in the sense that the due process clause 
is a source of rights apart from the specifics of the Bill of Rights. 
C. The Standard To Be Employed in Evaluating State Legislation 
One of the more important aspects of the case is the strict stand• 
ard employed by the Court in determining whether the Connecticut 
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was constitutional as 
applied to married couples. It was not enough for the state to point 
to what it regarded as some rational considerations to support the 
restriction on married couples as a means of enforcing a general 
policy directed against promiscuous or extramarital sexual relations. 
The opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas applied the familiar idea of the 
overbroad statute: a legitimate governmental policy cannot be 
achieved by means which are so unnecessarily broad that they invade 
areas of protected freedom. Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion stressed 
the idea that when a statute impairs fundamental personal liberties, 
the state must show that it is justified by a compelling public interest, 
and the law must be carefully tailored so as not to reach beyond the 
evil sought to be dealt with by intruding upon an important con-
stitutional interest. In his dissent in Poe, Mr. Justice Harlan said that 
when a statute abridges fundamental liberties, a closer scrutiny is 
required than that indicated by the rationality test; he found nothing 
that even remotely justified the obnoxiously intrusive means em-
ployed by Connecticut to effectuate a policy expressing the state's 
concern for its citizens' moral welfare. He pointed to the "utter 
novelty" of the Connecticut statute's ban on the use of contraceptives 
by married couples. 63 Mr. Justice White, in his concurring opinion 
in Griswold, stressed the point that a state cannot enter the realm of 
family life "without substantial justification,"64 and devoted a major 
part of his opinion to showing that no substantial justification was 
put forth to justify the sweeping scope of the statute and its telling 
effect on the freedom of married persons. 
It is thus evident that the several members of the Court feel that 
an exacting judicial scrutiny, like that employed in cases involving 
first amendment freedoms, is required when legislation impinges 
upon the realm of the family life and marital relationship. 
63. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961), 
64. 381 U.S. at 502. 
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IV. SOME COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
A. No Major Change in Constitutional Theory 
Insofar as the result in Griswold rests on the fundamental rights 
interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and as I interpret the opinions five Justices can be counted in 
support of this theory, the case states no new theory and is consistent 
with the main line of development under the substantive rights in-
terpretation of the liberty protected by the due process clause. It 
also supports the statement made earlier that the Court has never 
repudiated the fundamental rights theory. Furthermore, the result, 
is not at all inconsistent with the cases that have reduced economic 
liberty to a minimum of judicial protection, whether by denying that 
liberty of contract is a constitutionally protected right or by holding 
that it is subject to legislation that meets the test of rationality. The 
freedom of a legislature to determine economic policy in the public 
interest stands on a quite different level from its freedom to deter-
mine social policy by means that intrude upon personal liberty and 
essentially private conduct. It is fair to suppose that, notwithstand-
ing statements to the contrary in some opinions, the Court will 
continue to recognize some basis for judicial protection of economic 
and proprietary liberties. The essential point is that restrictions on 
economic liberty are subject to a less exacting judicial scrutiny, with 
greater deference being shown to the legislative judgment. Here the 
simple rationality test applies,65 but when legislation impinges upon 
fundamental non-economic liberties of an essentially personal charac-
ter, as in Griswold, a more exacting judicial test is applied. There is 
nothing new about the idea that the Court sees a hierarchy of values 
protected under the Constitution and that the degree of judicial 
scrutiny and protection varies in direct proportion to the importance 
of the right. The frequently voiced notion that first amendment 
freedoms are "preferred" is an expression of this idea.66 Similarly, in 
the interpretation of the equal protection clause the Court has made 
it clear that it is ready to depart from the rationality test in examin-
ing the constitutionality of legislative classification when the classifi-
cation either rests on a factor that the Court regards as impermissible 
in view of our whole constitutional tradition or serves the purpose 
of impairing important personal interests.67 
65. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (concurring opinion of 
White, J.); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). 
66. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959). 
67. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1965) (White, J.), rejecting the ration-
ality test when legislation is based on a racial classification; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
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B. Criticism of Mr. Justice Douglas' Opinion 
The opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas appears to me to be a 
labored attempt to identify the right of marital privacy with the 
specifics of the Bill of Rights. It says, when we penetrate the special 
vocabulary (peripheral rights, penumbras formed by emanations 
from specific rights, zones of privacy), that the right of marital 
privacy is implied from an aggregate of specifics. I have no difficulty 
with such a theory of implied rights. For example, the right to 
associate for the purpose of expressing views on political, economic, 
and social matters seems fairly to be implied from the first amend-
ment. It is another thing, however, to suggest that because marriage 
is a form of association it comes within the protection afforded free-
dom of association. The Bill of Rights does in various specifics recog-
nize zones of privacy in protecting persons, their homes, and even 
their political views from intrusion by government. Again, however, 
it is quite another thing to say that a general right of marital privacy 
can be distilled from these specifics. 68 It is not stretching things to 
say that the sanctity of the home protected against unreasonable 
searches and seizures implies a privacy of family life, as Mr. Justice 
Harlan pointed out in his illuminating dissent in Poe. But it pro-
tects this privacy against unreasonable intrusions by public officers; 
it is another thing to hold unconstitutional a law which has the 
effect of intruding into this privacy by subjecting marital intimacies 
to criminal sanctions and which could therefore be authority for a 
search and seizure to determine whether the statute is being violated. 
Insofar as the Court assumes to invalidate legislation by converting 
a freedom from unreasonable police searches into a fundamental 
substantive right restricting legislative action in formulating social 
policy, it is engaging in that expansive use of the judicial power to 
formulate conceptions of fundamental rights as a limitation on legis-
lative invasion which has characterized the judicial role under the 
due process clause. 
The point of the foregoing discussion is that a theory of rights 
implied from the specifics of the Bill of Rights can be pushed to 
the point where the distinction between such "implied" rights and 
the formulation of "fundamental" rights in the interpretation of the 
due process clause is wholly verbal and without substance. The 
question that may be raised about all this is whether the Court, 
U.S. 535 (1942), holding invalid a classification used in a statute requiring the steriliza-
tion of habitual criminals; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), holding invalid a 
state legislative apportionment system because of its discriminatory impact on the right 
to vote. 
68. 381 U.S. 479, 508-09 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.), 
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through the peripheral-emanations-penumbra process of interpreta-
tion, is really finding a more objective and more secure basis for the 
new right it has recognized than is found in the fundamental rights 
interpretation of the due process clause. Indeed, in order to com-
mand the support of a majority of the Court, it is still essential to 
find that the right embraced within penumbras of the specifics of the 
Bill of Rights is a fundamental right; judicial subjectivity thus still 
plays a crucial part in the final decision. 
The accordion-like qualities of the emanations-and-penumbra 
theory, and the ease with which it can· be used in the same broad 
way in which the fundamental rights theory has been used, become 
evident when one considers its application to areas where the Court 
in recent years has limited the sphere of constitutional protection. 
The point is made that since liberty of contract is not mentioned 
in the Constitution, it should not be a constitutionally protected 
right. Yet, since the body of the Constitution protects against the 
impairment of the obligations of contracts, it does not require a far-
fetched application of the emanations-and-penumbra theory to sug-
gest that implicit in the contracts clause ( or at least radiating from it) 
is a constitutional right to enter into contracts. Likewise, it may be 
suggested that since the fifth amendment protects property against 
expropriation ·without compensation, ~here is surely a penumbra of 
rights emanating from this which would include the right to acquire 
and enjoy the use of property without arbitrary interference by the 
government. I am not suggesting that the Court will arrive at these 
results through the application of the peripheral-emanations-penum-
bra idea. The only point I wish to make is that in extending the 
specifics to the periphery, and in finding rights derived from the total 
scheme of the Bill of Rights, the Court is applying essentially the 
same process as that used in the fundamental rights approach, but 
dignifying it with a different name and thereby creating the illusion 
of greater objectivity. 
As was made clear in the concurring opinions, the past decisions 
of the Court, notably the Meyer and Pierce cases, offered an imn;tedi-
ate opening for finding that marital privacy, as a facet of the freedom 
of family life, was a fundamental right. Yet Mr. Justice Douglas, 
steadfastly adhering to the objective of finding the protected right 
embraced within the specifics of the first eight amendments, rejected 
this opening. While declaring that the Court reaffirmed the prin-
ciples of these two cases, he interpreted them as showing that the first 
and fourteenth amendments forbid a state to contract the spectrum of 
learning-an interpretation that would have been astonishing to 
Mr. Justice McReynolds, who wrote the opinion in these cases, 
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which rested squarely on the fundamental rights interpretation of 
the due process clause. 
It appears also that Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Griswold opinion, 
retreated from his dissenting opinion in Poe, where he indicated that 
the Court should invalidate, in the name of the due process clause, 
legislation that impinged on an interest "implicit in a free society." 
His reason for abandoning this idea in Griswold is perhaps to be 
found in the responsibility he faced for writing an opinion for the 
Court that would avoid the inevitable division flowing from a 
straightforward substantive rights interpretation of the due process 
clause. But his effort, if it can be explained on this basis, was not a 
richly rewarding one in view of the divisions within the Court and 
the separate concurring opinions. 
C. The Ninth Amendment 
Mr. Justice Goldberg's use of the ninth amendment is an inter-
esting tour de force, but I fail to see how it adds in any substantial 
way to the argument respecting the fundamental rights theory. For 
years the Court followed the theory without finding it necessary to 
fall back on the ninth amendment, which was certainly designed as 
a limitation on the federal government. Perhaps the ninth amend-
ment argument gives some satisfaction to Justices who have a sense 
of uneasiness about going outside the Constitution in protecting 
certain kinds of rights and helps to support further the illusion of 
objectivity. Even if one were to concede that the use of the ninth 
amendment negated the Black-Stewart hypothesis, however, it is 
apparent that the basic problems in the use of the fundamental 
rights theory still remain: what rights are fundamental and to what 
limitations are they subject? One may conclude that the ninth 
amendment adds a nice ornament to the argument, but that is about 
all. On the other hand, the rejections by Justices Black and Stewart 
of the ninth amendment argument are not very persuasive either. 
Their point of emphasis is that the ninth and tenth amendments 
were intended to make it clear that the federal government is one 
of restricted powers. This may be conceded, yet the ninth amend-
ment would still support the position taken by Mr. Justice Goldberg 
that the first eight amendments were not deemed exhaustive of the 
rights enjoyed by the people. The weakest part, however, of the 
Black-Stewart argument based on the ninth amendment is that the 
whole history of the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment has 
been a story of the forging of new limitations on the states. Particu-
larly .at the hands of Mr. Justice Black, it has been a process of making 
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applicable to the states the specifics of the first eight amendments. 
By equal force of reasoning, the ninth amendment should be incor-
porated into the fourteenth. If it is a "somersault of history" to use 
the ninth amendment as a weapon of interpretation in order to 
restrict a state's legislative power, it is certainly no greater somer-
sault of history than that involved in finding that the states are sub-
ject to the establishment-o~-religion clause of the first amendment, 
when it is clear that historically the principal purpose of that clause 
was to prohibit Congress from interfering with state establishments.69 
D. Mr. Justice Black's Thesis 
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Black reaffirmed and en-
larged upon the basic view expressed in his dissent in Adamson that 
the Court has no business invalidating state legislation that does not 
violate the specifics of the Bill of Rights or other specifics found in 
the Constitution. The whole fundamental rights theory is anathema 
to him as an expression of judicial subjectivity and of natural rights 
philosophy. Yet his proposed application to the states of all the 
specifics of the Bill of Rights is in itself an extraordinary assertion 
of judicial power, unsupported by the text or history of the four-
teenth amendment.70 Moreover, Black's thesis runs into difficulties 
when account is taken both of the ninth amendment, which accord-
ing to his logic should also be made applicable to the states, and of 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, both of which furnish 
means for invalidating governmental action on grounds other than 
those stated in the specifics of the Bill of Rights. An even more basic 
consideration, however, is that some of the so-called specifics of the 
Bill of Rights are not so very specific; they admit of a very large 
element of judicial subjectivity and discretion in their application, as 
evidenced by Mr. Justice Douglas' use of peripheries, emanations, 
and penumbras in his Griswold opinion. It happens that Mr. Justice 
Black cannot subscribe to an expansive use of the specifics in this 
particular case. Yet it will be recalled that it was Mr. Justice Black 
who wrote the opinion of the Court in Brotherhood of Railway 
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,71 in which the Court 
protected, as an associational right under the first amendment, the 
right of a railway union to assist the prosecution of claims by in-
jured railroad workers through the giving of advice on their rights 
69. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (dissenting opinion of 
Stewart, J.). 
70. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights1 
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). . 
'71. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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and the channeling of legal employment to particular la'wyers. This 
is certainly a more extensive and more distinctively marginal use of 
the first amendment than the use of the specifics to protect the right 
of privacy in the Griswold case.72 To exclude the privacy of marital 
association from protection under the Bill of Rights, while using the 
first amendment as an umbrella for the kind of associational rig~t 
protected in the Brotherhood case, appears to be a case of straining 
at gnats while swallowing a camel. Moreover, as was suggested by 
Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Griswold, the 
breadth of the interpretation of the equal protection clause in 
Reynolds v. Sims78 and of Article I in Wesberry v. Sanders,74 whereby 
the Court used those provisions as vehicles for invalidating legisla-
tive apportionment systems, is a much more audacious and far-reach-
ing judicial interferenc~ with the state legislative process, sanctioned 
neither by history nor by the specifics of the Constitution, than the 
comparatively innocuous use of judicial power in Griswold to in-
validate a law which was found on the statute books of a single state 
and which in most respects was not being enforced. Compared with 
the use. of judicial power in the apportionment cases, Griswold is but 
a tempest in a teapot in its use of judicial power to invalidate a 
statute impinging on the right of privacy. The equal protection 
clause is as much an invitation to judicial formulation of policy as 
the due process clause. In his dissent in Griswold, Mr. Justice Black 
protested against the idea that it is the Court's duty to keep the Con-
stitution in tune with the times and quoted with approval the late 
Judge Learned Hand's statement that he would.find it most irksome 
"to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians."75 Mr. Justice Harlan 
applauded these sentiments and suggested that the Court would 
have been well advised to heed this advice when dealing with the 
apportionment issue. 
72. See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), where the Court made a 
curious use of the "cruel and unusual punishment" limitation in invalidating a state 
statute which, as construed, made it a crime to be a drug addict. This is another 
instance where the Court, as an alternative to a straightforward application of the 
familiar idea that the due process clause states an independent substantive limitation 
on the arbitrary exercise of governmental power, achieved the same result by resorting 
to a strained interpretation of a Dill of Rights specific in giving content to the due 
process limitation. See the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, and the follow• 
ing language from Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion: "Finally, I deem this appli• 
cation of 'cruel and unusual punishment' so novel that I suspect the Court was hard 
put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result reached 
today rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty. If this case involved economic 
regulation, the present Court's allergy to substantive due process would surely save 
the statute and prevent the Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections 
upon state legislatures or Congress." 370 U.S. at 689. 
73. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
74. 376 U.S. I (1964). 
75. 381 U.S. at 526 (quoting from HAND, THE DILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958)). 
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Justices Black and Stewart interpret the Court's recent decisions 
as a repudiation of fundamental rights thinking. Thus Mr. Justice 
Black referred to Griswold as a retreat from Ferguson v. Skrupa,76 
in which he had said that the Court had long since discarded the idea 
that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional 
when th~y believe the legislature has acted unwisely. They view 
recent cases finding legislation invalid under the due process clause 
as meaning only that the Court uses this clause to enforce procedural 
fairness, to condemn vague criminal legislation, and to invalidate 
legislation that abridges the specifics of the Bill of Rights.77 But 
surely a case like Aptheker v. Secretary of State,78 holding the denial 
of passports to Communists invalid under the due process clause as 
an over-broad restriction on the right to travel protected under the · 
due process clause, is an affirmation of the fundamental rights in-
terpretation of due process. Mr. Justice Black asserted in Griswold 
that if Aptheker "was written or intended to bring about the abrupt 
and drastic reversal in the course of constitutional adjudication 
which is now attributed to it, the change was certainly made in a 
very quiet and unprovocative manner, without any attempt to justify 
it."79 But one may ask in turn whether all of the Justices who con-
curred in the Skrupa opinion understood that they were overruling 
sub silentio earlier cases like Meyer and Pierce. As Griswold has 
made clear, the notion of substantive due process shows a remarkable 
vitality despite Mr. Justice Black's several efforts to lay it to rest and 
to pronounce a fitting requiem. 
As Justices Black and Stewart so well pointed out, there is always 
the danger that the Court, in employing the fundamental rights 
theory, will substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. in 
determining what is wise economic or social policy. This risk, how-
ever, is inherent in the system of judicial review and occurs when-
ever the Court invalidates a legislative act, whether in the name of 
due process or equal protection, in the name of the broad specifics of 
the Bill of Rights, or in the name of the peripheral rights embraced 
in the penumbra of the specifics, -and regardless of whether the Court 
employs a technique of balancing interests or uses a standard of 
reasonableness, or employs a more exacting judicial scrutiny as in 
the instant case. The basic problem is not whether a court in exer-
cising the power of judicial review may pass judgment on legislative 
76. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
77. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 517 n.10 (dissenting opinion of Black, 
J.); id. at 528, 530 n.7 (dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.). One very interesting aspect 
of Griswold is the wide differences among the Justices in interpreting prior cases. 
78. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
79. 381 U.S. at 517 n.10. 
·258 Michigan Law Review 
acts, but rather how wisely it exercises this power in identifying, 
appraising, and weighing the competing interests. The Court is 
_always faced with the task of defining the right and determining the 
standard to be employed in passing on the constitutionality of legis-
lation impinging on the right. These are two distinctive aspects of the 
judicial function in these cases. '.To refuse to recognize a right claimed 
to be basic to our constitutional order for fear that the Court, in 
exercising its power to protect that right, will employ a standard 
whereby it usurps the legislative function in determining basic social 
policy, obscures analysis of the Court's role and denies the Court's 
resourcefulness in employing standards appropriate to the particular 
case. Itis worth emphasizing here that the members of the Court who 
found the Connecticut statute invalid as applied to invade the realm 
of marital rights did not purport to pass judgment on the wisdom 
or reasonableness of the general moral policy expressed in the legis-
lation. 
E. Conclusion 
Griswold v. Connecticut is a reaffirmation of a power long exer-
cised by the Court in protecting fundamental rights. It required no 
judicial roving at large to reach the conclusion that the freedom of 
the marital relationship is a part of the bundle of rights associated 
with home, family, and marriage-rights supported by precedent, 
history, and common understanding. For a court to find that these 
rights are fundamental, whether because they are deeply written in 
the tradition and conscience of our people, are part of the concept of 
ordered liberty, are implicit in the notion of a free society, or ema-
nate from the totality of the constitutional order, involves no im-
modest or startling exercise of judicial power. The decision operates 
within a narrow sphere. In exercising its power in Griswold to pro-
tect a fundamental personal liberty, the Court, far from advancing to 
a new milepost on the high road to judicial supremacy, was treading 
a worn and familiar path. 
